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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This matter went before the Honorable Judge Ernie W. Jones in the Second Judicial
District Court in Ogden, Utah on April 5, 2017 with the Second District Court entering its final
Judgment on April 28, 2018. On May 23, 2017, Appellant, by and through counsel, timely filed
a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, where appellate jurisdiction was proper
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h).

ISSUES PRESENTED
1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
APPELLANT’S PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE
DISPARAGEMENT PROVISION.
a.

Controlling Authority:
i.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, 12(b)(6).
ii.
Bayles v. Bayles, 1999 UT App 128.
b.
Standard of Review:
i.
“A trial court’s decision granting a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a
complaint for lack of a remedy is a question of law that we review for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court’s ruling.” Oakwood
Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 9.
ii.
“The determination of the trial court that there [has or has not] been a
substantial change in circumstances ... is presumed valid, and we review
the ruling under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, ¶ 11. (alteration and
omission in original).
2. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENJOINING THE
APPELLEE FROM DISPARAGING THE APPELLANT.
a.
b.

Controlling Authority: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 65A(a)(e)-(f).
Standard of Review:
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i.

An appellate court “will not disturb a district court’s denial of a preliminary
injunction ‘unless the court abused its discretion or rendered a decision clearly
against the weight of the evidence.’” Zagg, Inc. v. Harmer, 2015 UT App 52, ¶1.

3. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE APPELLANT
LEAVE OF COURT TO AMEND THE VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE.
a.
b.

Controlling Authority: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a).
Standard of Review:
i.
“We review a district court’s denial of leave to amend for an abuse of
discretion. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this leave should be
granted liberally. But we have held that this liberality is limited, such as, for
example, when it would result in prejudice to the opposing party,
when leave to amend is sought during or after trial instead of before trial, or if
the amendments would be futile.” Hudgens v. Prosper, Inc. 2010 UT 68, ¶¶1011.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

The following rules of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are of central importance to the
appeal.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e) and (f):
(e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a showing
by the applicant that:
(e)(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues;
(e)(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed
order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined;
(e)(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and
(e)(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the
underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the
subject of further litigation.
(f) Domestic relations cases. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the equitable
powers of the courts in domestic relations cases.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6):
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(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, . . .
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a):
(a) Amendments before trial.
(a)(1) A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within:
(a)(1)(A) 21 days after serving it; or
(a)(1)(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days
after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under
Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
(a)(2) In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the court’s permission
or the opposing party’s written consent. The party must attach its proposed amended
pleading to the motion to permit an amended pleading. The court should freely give
permission when justice requires.
(a)(3) Any required response to an amended pleading must be filed within the time
remaining to respond to the original pleading or within 14 days after service of the amended
pleading, whichever is later.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: The present case arises out of a marriage and subsequent and recent
divorce of the parties. The Appellant is asking this Court to draw a line for divorced parties
with non-disparagement clauses in their decrees to assist them in knowing the boundaries
between natural venting about an ex-spouse and highly offensive disparagement of an exspouse. In this case, the Appellant asserts the trial court erred in finding that Appellee’s
extensive campaign to disparage her ex-husband was the natural frustration of divorce. The
Appellant petitioned the court to modify the parties’ Decree of Divorce due to more than 300
printed pages disparaging the Appellant that were published by Appellee after the entry of the
Decree of Divorce. The publications spanned three media outlets (a book chapter, an on-line
essay for a prominent website, and extensive social media posts), and are believed to represent
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only a small fraction of the total disparagement waged by the Appellee. The Appellant
petitioned to modify Paragraph 22 of the parties’ Decree of Divorce seeking to expand an
already-existing non-disparagement order that enjoins only the Appellee. Paragraph 22 states in
full: “Non-disparagement. Mary Ellen shall not tell third parties that (1) Michael kicked her
out of the house, or (2) Michael has stolen marital assets.” The Appellant also sought to
restrain the Appellee pursuant to Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure during the
proceedings related to his Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. (R. Vol. 1, 279-280;
Resp’t’s Dec, ¶2).
In this case, without the knowledge or consent of the Appellant, the Appellee has
published private, intimate facts about the Appellant and further cast him in a false light in an
extensive and pervasive manner that is highly offensive. The Appellee’s actions were not
known by the Appellant, nor could have been known by the Appellant, at the time the Decree of
Divorce was entered. Thus, the Appellant sought to modify the Decree of Divorce based on a
substantial and material change in circumstances that were not contemplated at the time the
parties’ Decree of Divorce was entered by the Second District Court.
Course of the Proceedings: The Second Judicial Court entered a final judgment on April
28, 2017 after oral argument arising from two objections to the Commissioner’s
recommendations of December 6, 2016 and March 7, 2017. The December 6, 2016 hearing
related to Appellant’s Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and the March 7,
2017 hearing related to Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Verified Petition to Modify. The Second
District Court ordered the dismissal of Appellant’s petition to modify and upheld the
Commissioner’s ruling to vacate the temporary restraining order. The Notice of Appeal was
timely filed on May 23, 2017.
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The District Court granted the Appellee’s motion to dismiss the petition to modify even
though the Commissioner granted the Appellant’s request to amend his petition. The District
Court held that the Appellant was seeking to litigate a tort claim; however, the instant case is
not a tort action.
The District Court found that the Appellee’s statements were no more than traditional,
post-marital bickering. However, the Appellee’s public statements about the Respondent arise
out of the marriage and divorce and could not emerge out of any other set of circumstances
other than the marriage due to the private nature of the facts.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

The Decree of Divorce was entered on November 10, 2015. (R. Vol. 1, 47)

2.

The parties were married for approximately eight years. (R. Vol. 1, 48)

3.

The parties have no children at issue from the marriage. (R. Vol. 1, 48)

4.

The parties negotiated a settlement agreement and signed it on July 8, 2015. (R.

Vol. 1, 6 )
5.

Paragraph 22 of the Decree of Divorce states: “Non-disparagement. Mary Ellen

shall not tell third parties that (1) Michael kicked her out of the house, or (2) Michael has stolen
marital assets.” (R. Vol. 1, 53)
6.

The Appellant filed a Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce on or about

November 15, 2016 seeking to modify Paragraph 22 of the Decree of Divorce. (R. Vol. 1, 67)
7.

The Appellant did not learn of almost 300 pages of disparaging comments about

him by the Appellee until after he had filed the petition to modify. (R. Vol. 1, 93, 117, 623; p.
14 of Transcript)
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8.

The Appellant filed an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order on

November 15, 2017. (R. Vol. 1, 71)
9.

The Commissioner heard arguments on December 6, 2016 on the Ex Parte

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and vacated the temporary restraining order with
orders entered on December 15, 2016. (R. Vol. 1, 468)
10.

On December 20, 2016, the Appellant filed an Objection to the Commissioner’s

Order issued on December 6, 2016. (R. Vol. 1, 515)
11.

The Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellant’s Verified Petition to Modify

Decree of Divorce on or about November 29, 2016 and oral arguments were heard on or about
March 7, 2017. (R. Vol. 1, 451)
12.

Subsequent to the Decree of Divorce being entered, the Appellant learned of a

chapter the Appellee published and a public reading of her book chapter at King’s English
bookstore where the Appellee discloses private and confidential facts about the Appellee. (R.
Vol. 1, 90)
13.

Subsequent to the Decree of Divorce being entered, the Appellant learned that the

Appellee had published more some 300 pages of disparaging or defaming comments about the
Appellant in a closed, but public on-line forum. (R. Vol. 1, 117; Exhibit E)
14.

The book with Appellee’s chapter is entitled Baring Witness: 36 Mormon Women

Talk Candidly about Love, Sex and Marriage (edited by Holly Welker and published in July
2016 by the University of Illinois Press). The Appellee contributed a chapter entitled “Mormon
Marriage Surprise.” (R. Vol. 1, 106) In her chapter, the Appellee publically communicates the
following private and confidential facts that could only be known from the context of the
privacy of a marriage:
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a. Private medical issues related to our fertility as a couple (R. Vol. 1, 106-110);
b. Personal and intimate conversations that took place during our private and
confidential couples’ therapy sessions (R. Vol. 1, 106-110)
15.

At a September 21, 2016 public reading event at the King’s English book store

(located at 1511 S. 1500 E, Salt Lake City, Utah; public social media announcement of this
event (R. Vol. 1, 112)) for the Baring Witness book referenced above, the Appellee publically
communicates the following private and confidential facts:
a. Private medical issues related to fertility as a couple (R. Vol. 1, 112);
b. Personal and intimate conversations that took place during private and
confidential couples’ therapy sessions. (R. Vol. 1, 112)
16.

Regarding the above-mentioned public reading at the King’s English bookstore,

the Salt Lake Tribune’s acclaimed and seasoned journalist, Peggy Fletcher Stack, covered this
event where the Appellee participated (along with six other contributing authors) by reading
excerpts from her chapter. (R. Vol. 1, 113-115)
17.

Ms. Stack posted a link to her subsequent Salt Lake Tribune newspaper article on

her social media Facebook page that questioned the probity of disclosures from the book’s
authors with the following statement:
a. “[The book is] a collection of fascinating stories.... I do wonder how ex-spouses
will feel when reading about their intimate lives and the dissolution of their
marriages” (R. Vol. 1, 116)
18.

In an extensive compilation of postings at the online “What Women Know

Google Group” spanning nearly 300 printed page, the Appellee publically communicates the
following private and confidential facts. (R. Vol. 1, 117-387)
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a. Appellee discloses matters related to personal medical facts concerning services
the Appellant procured at the Planned Parenthood clinic (R. Vol. 1, 294) (Exhibit
E, p. 178);
b. Appellee discloses matters related to personal medical facts concerning the
Appellant’s attempted vasectomy reversal (R. Vol. 1, 304) (Exhibit E, p. 188);
c. Appellee discloses matters related to Appellant’s intimate sexual attitudes and
practices (R. Vol. 1, 288) (Exhibit E, p. 172);
d. Appellee discloses matters regarding intimate conversations that took place in the
parties’ confidential couple’s therapy sessions (R. Vol. 1, 132, 133, 134, 202 &
237) (Exhibit E, pp. 16, 17, 18, 86 & 121);
e. Many additional statements were made in Exhibit E by Appellee that has invaded
the Appellant’s privacy by publically communicating facts or information of a
confidential, personal and private nature (R. Vol. 1, 203, 204, 211, 220, 280, 289,
313, 318, 339, 341, 377 & 386) (Exhibit E, pp. 87, 88, 95, 104, 164, 173, 197,
202, 223, 226, 262 & 271).
19.

In an essay published at www.the-exponent.com dated 11 May 2016 and titled

“Single Again,” Appellee makes the following defamatory statement, which is false or
otherwise serves to cast the Appellant in a false and misleading light. (R. Vol. 1, 388)
a. Appellee falsely insinuates that the Appellant was abusive by claiming she was in
a “marriage” that was “abusive” (R. Vol. 1, 388-390).
b. Appellee directly refutes this assertion of abuse in her own words in her
publications to the online chat group where she states: “I was not physically
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harmed,” but then goes on to falsely claim “but every indicator of financial abuse
was present in the marriage to some degree” (R. Vol. 1, 313) (Exhibit E, p. 173).
20.

In the extensive compilation of postings at the online “What Women Know

Google Group” referenced above, Appellee seeks to cause harm to the Appellant's professional
standing and makes the following defamatory statements, which are false or otherwise serve to
cast the Appellant in a false and misleading light:
a. Appellee encourages people to seek for the Appellant’s “resignation from the
Sunstone board of Trustees” (R. Vol. 1, 335) (Exhibit E, p. 219);
b. Appellee insinuates that the Appellant falsified court documents (i.e., that the
Appellant committed perjury) and that she would need to investigate further by
using a forensic accountant (R. Vol. 1, 293) (Exhibit E, p. 177);
c. Appellee states that she “uncovered some major shenanigans and financial
dealings” allegedly committed by the Appellant (R. Vol. 1, 211) (Exhibit E, p.
95);
d. Appellee states that she wants to “hold him accountable for the financial
shenanigans he’s pulled.... Mike [the Appellant] took money” (R. Vol. 1, 222)
(Exhibit E, p. 106);
e. Appellee falsely insinuates that Appellant was engaging in “financial abuse” by
attempting to “sabotage [her] career” (R. Vol. 1, 334) (Exhibit E, p. 218);
f. Appellee falsely states she was the victim of “persistent undermining emotional
and verbal abuse” perpetrated by Appellant (R. Vol. 1, 336) (Exhibit E, p. 220);
g. Appellee writes obliquely about her being a victim of abuse (R. Vol. 1, 371)
(Exhibit E, p. 256); whereas she earlier directly refutes this assertion by her own
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words in this same online chat group where she states: “I was not physically
harmed,” but then goes on to falsely claim “but every indicator of financial abuse
was present in the marriage to some degree” (R. Vol. 1, 289) (Exhibit E, p. 173);
h. Appellee falsely claims that “the abuse continues for me!” and encourages others
to share the information widely (R. Vol. 1, 373) (Exhibit E, p. 258);
i. Appellee disparages the Appellant when she states: “Enough with the financial
abuse, already” (R. Vol. 1, 378) (Exhibit E, p. 263).
j. Many additional statements are made in Exhibit E by Appellee that disparage
Appellant or otherwise serve to cast him in a false or misleading light (R. Vol. 1,
213-380) (Exhibit E, pp. 97, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 112, 113, 114, 121,
122, 123, 124, 125, 145, 146, 148, 150, 153, 154, 163, 164, 165, 170, 171, 173,
178, 179, 181, 188, 189, 203, 204, 208, 226, 234, 235, 237, 238, 245, 247, 250,
253, 254, 255, 260, 264 & 265).
21.

Third parties—most of whom actively participate in academic areas essential to

Appellant’s professional and career success—have made the following statements,
demonstrating clearly that they have been negatively influenced by Appellee’s disparaging
public comments about Appellant, and confirming that she has been quite successful in her
campaign to disparage the Appellant and impugn his character, reputation, and good standing in
a community essential to his professional and career success:
a. Redacted third party asks about Appellant: “Is there any way to get him off the
board [at Sunstone]?” (R. Vol. 1, 335) (Exhibit E, p. 219);
b. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “Voldemike [aka, Ms. Robertson’s
pseudonym for the Appellant] is one of the most devious, duplicitous, selfish,
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arrogant pigs I’ve ever been acquainted with” (R. Vol. 1, 309) (Exhibit E, p.
193);
c. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “How power-abusive is that?” (R.
Vol. 1, 203) (Exhibit E, p. 87);
d. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “Promise us you’ll get a lawyer to
deal with the shenanigans Mike has pulled” (R. Vol. 1, 212) (Exhibit E, p. 96);
e. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “What a hostile douche canoe he’s
being.... What a child.” (R. Vol. 1, 224) (Exhibit E, p. 108);
f. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “[Mike is] arrogant and selfabsorbed” (R. Vol. 1, 230) (Exhibit E, p. 114);
g. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “He’s obfuscating to distract from
his financial shenanigans. What a shithead.” (R. Vol. 1, 239) (Exhibit E, p. 123);
h. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “Sorry he’s a jerkwad” (R. Vol. 1,
267) (Exhibit E, p. 151);
i. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “[I’m] disgusted with Mike” (R. Vol.
1, 268) (Exhibit E, p. 152);
j. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “This level of betrayal is so hurtful.
Sounds like a master. Makes me so sad – his mother is a lovely woman.” (R. Vol.
1, 272) (Exhibit E, p. 156);
k. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “...this screams financial idiocy, ...he
is purposefully cruel to you, ...he’s mismanaging money, ...it was stupid” (R.
Vol. 1, 280) (Exhibit E, p. 164);
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l. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “I’m absolutely disgusted by his
behavior, ...that sorry excuse for a man” (R. Vol. 1, 286) (Exhibit E, p. 170);
m. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “This financial stuff is totally
duplicitous and dishonest. It’s VERY strange” (R. Vol. 1, 290) (Exhibit E, p.
174);
n. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “Voldemike [aka, Ms. Robertson’s
pseudonym forthe Appellant] is... incredibly stupid” (R. Vol. 1, 293) (Exhibit E,
p. 177);
o. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “I am continually astounded at the
depth of Voldemike’s douchebaggery & a$$holedness. What a DICK!!!!!!” (R.
Vol. 1, 321) (Exhibit E, p. 205);
p. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “What a fucking, cheating, lying,
duplicitous, spineless sack of dog shit” (R. Vol. 1, 325) (Exhibit E, p. 209);
q. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “I’m willing to bet that the source
[of a rumor about Ms. Robertson] can be traced back to Voldemike [aka, Ms.
Robertson’s pseudonym for the Appellant].” (R. Vol. 1, 334) (Exhibit E, p. 218);
r. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “What a douchebag. He is an
incredibly abusive man toward you” (R. Vol. 1, 336) (Exhibit E, p. 220);
s. Redacted third party states about Appellant: “Who is this petty, small-minded,
douchebag of an a$$hole person you used to be married to?” (R. Vol. 1, 354)
(Exhibit E, p. 238);
t. Many additional statements were made in Exhibit E by third party individuals
confirming that Appellee has been quite successful in her campaign to falsely
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disparage and impugn the Appellant's character, reputation, and good standing in
a community essential to his professional and career success (R. Vol. 1, 169-380)
(Exhibit E, pp. 53, 58, 70, 89, 90, 107, 112, 113, 125, 131, 146, 148, 153, 171,
212, 253, 254, 257¸258, 259¸263, 264 & 265).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The District Court erred in granting the Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce. Utah case law is very clear that “dismissal is a severe measure and should
be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state
of facts which could be proved in support of its claim.” Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT App 36, ¶
9 (citing Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). In this case, the
Appellant is entitled to pursue his petition because he has pled a material and substantial change
in the circumstances.
The material and substantial change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of
entry of the Decree of Divorce are the vast disparaging comments by the Appellee and were
enumerate above. At the time the parties negotiated their Decree of Divorce, the Appellant was
acting in good faith and had no reason to consider the likelihood that the Appellee was actively
engaging in a vast campaign to defame his reputation and good standing and to share private
and intimate facts related to their marriage. As a result, the understandably narrow scope of
Paragraph 22 restraining the Appellee from disparaging the Appellant seemed adequate and
proper. Notwithstanding, once the extent of the Appellee's actions came to light, the Appellant,
through his petition, sought to amend Paragraph 22, which states: “Non-disparagement. Mary
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Ellen shall not tell third parties that (1) Michael kicked her out of the house, or (2) Michael has
stolen marital assets.”
Utah courts have been clear that “[t]o succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree,
the moving party must first show that a substantial material change of circumstances has
occurred since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree
itself.” Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, ¶ 11. The Appellant clearly and abundantly
meets this standard. Additionally, at the time of filing his petition, the Appellant moved the
Trial Court for a preliminary injunction to restrain the Appellee from making additional
disparaging comments.
The District Court held that the Appellant was seeking to litigate a tort claim; however,
the instant case is not a tort action, but a petition to modify a decree of divorce. Although the
Appellant concedes that the present case does have elements to it that may sound in tort, he
nonetheless is not seeking to litigate for tortious remedies before this court. Utah appellate
courts have made clear that trial courts can consider torts in divorce actions, but that torts
cannot be litigated in divorce actions. Bayles v. Bayles, 1999 UT App 128.
In summary, the District Court found that the Appellee’s statements were no more than
traditional, post-marital bickering. The facts of this case show that Appellee’s actions are not
traditional, post-divorce meanness, but rather highly offensive disparagement that have falsely
impugned the character and reputational standing of the Appellant in professional communities
central to the success of his livelihood. What’s more is that Appellee’s book chapter and over
300 pages of scorched-earth disparagement have been published in print and posted on the
Internet, and can thus never be retracted.
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The Appellee’s public statements about the Respondent arise out of the marriage and
divorce and could not emerge out of any other set of circumstances other than the marriage due
to the private nature of the facts. The Appellee’s statements include the following: the private
fact that the Appellant underwent a failed vasectomy reversal; private matters relating to the
Appellant’s intimate sexual attitudes and practices during their courtship and marriage; personal
and intimate information about the Appellant that took place during the parties’ private and
confidential couples’ therapy sessions; private medical facts related to the fertility of the parties
when married; Appellant’s private financial information; the fact that the Appellant procured
medical services for intimate health screenings; false and malicious claims that Appellant was
abusive or an abuser; disparaging, false and misleading comments about the Appellant’s
professional abilities and trustworthiness that have succeeded in damaging his reputation with
long-standing colleagues; false and malicious accusations that the Appellant lied on his
financial declaration to the family court and is thus guilty of the criminal act of perjury; and that
the Appellee accused the Appellant of being so dishonest with marital finances that she
repeatedly claimed the need to acquire the services of a forensic accountant to ascertain the
extent of his deceptions.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE’S MOTION TO
DISMISS BECAUSE THE APPELLANT HAS A LEGAL BASIS FOR
MODIFICATION

In determining whether a trial court correctly granted a motion to dismiss, an appellate
court must “accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider them, and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving

15

party.” MFS Series Trust III v. Grainger, 2004 UT 61, ¶ 6. The Utah Supreme Court has made
clear that under a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, an appellate court’s inquiry is concerned solely with
“the sufficiency of the pleadings, [and] not the underlying merits of [the] case.” Oakwood
Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 8 (citing Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 989
(Utah 1997). In this case, the Appellant submitted his petition to modify the parties’ Decree of
Divorce with sufficiency. If any concern were over sufficiency, the trial court should have
provided leave of court for the Appellant to amend his original petition such as the Appellant
did in this case (see argument below).
Additionally, the bar is high for dismissal. This Court has previously noted that “[a]
dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a
party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its
claim.” Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT App 36, ¶ 9 (citing Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). In the instant case, as shown below, the Appellant has a legal basis
for modification, which is a material and substantial change in the circumstances not
contemplated at the time of entry of the Decree of Divorce. See Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT
App 36, ¶ 13. (Dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is only warranted in cases when “even if the
factual assertions in the complaint were correct, they provide no legal basis for recovery.”)

a.

THE APPELLANT ALLEGED MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGES IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES NOT CONTEMPLATED AT
THE TIME OF ENTRY OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE

The parties entered a mediated, settlement agreement on July 8, 2015, which resulted in
a Decree of Divorce entered by the Second District Court on November 10, 2015. The
Appellant sought to modify the Decree of Divorce’s Paragraph 22, which states the following:
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“Non-disparagement. Mary Ellen shall not tell third parties that (1) Michael kicked her out of
the house, or (2) Michael has stolen marital assets.” Over the course of a year subsequent to the
Decree of Divorce being entered, the Appellee published writings in wide-ranging media that
contained disparaging comments, if not out-right lies, about the Appellant and published other
statements that pervasively disclosed private and confidential facts about the Appellant. The
media included a book chapter (in a book published by University of Illinois press), an essay on
a widely-read website, and postings at the online “What Women Know Google Group”
spanning nearly 300 printed pages.
There are a number of factors an appellate court must consider when reviewing a trial
court’s decision on a petition to modify a decree of divorce. First, for a party “[t]o succeed on a
petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must first show that a substantial material
change of circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the
decree itself.” Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, ¶ 11. In this case, all of the Appellee’s
publications emerged after the Decree of Divorce was entered or, in the case of the Google
Group’s approximate 300 pages, the Appellant could not have known of the comments (some
were made before divorce, but most were made after divorce). Therefore, the Appellant asserts
that the new publications about the Appellant constitute a material and substantial change in the
circumstances that were not contemplated at the time since entry of the Decree of Divorce.
Arguably, if there were no Paragraph 22 of the Decree of Divorce, there would be nothing to
modify; if there were no Paragraph 22, arguably the Appellant would be seeking to litigate a
tort in a divorce action. However, all the Appellant seeks to do is expand the parties’
disparagement clause in the Decree of Divorce based on the substantial new information that
has now come to light.
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Additionally, an appellate court “can properly find abuse [of discretion] only if no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Goggin v. Goggin, 2011 UT
76, ¶ 26, 267 P.3d 885 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Appellant takes
seriously this extremely high standard and asserts that no reasonable person would consider
over 300 pages of disparaging statements, the disclosure of private and intimate facts, and a
host of lies, not to constitute a material and substantial change in circumstances not
contemplated at the time of entry of the decree of divorce.
The District Court abused its discretion when holding that the Honorable Commissioner
Wilson did not err when “she recommended that Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss be granted on
the basis of failure to allege a substantial and material change in circumstances.” The Trial
Court stated the following:
On the second question, the motion to modify, again, I'm going to deny the
objection. Again, I just don’t think this is a material change in circumstances.
The parties hated each other, disliked each other before. They disliked each other
during and they still dislike each other. I just don’t see there’s a material change
in circumstances. (R. Vol. 1, 636; Transcript, 27)
In this case, the Trial Court has confused mean-spirited, post-divorce venting with outright,
highly offensive, false, and malicious disparagement (including, defamation and invasions of
privacy) published for all the world to see. In the Internet age, none of these publications can
be retracted. This Court must draw a line for divorcing parties between meanness and highly
offensive, disparaging comments.
The critically important fact in this case is the already-existing Paragraph 22 in the
Decree of Divorce that restrains the Appellee.
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b.

APPELLE’S HIGHLY OFFENSIVE DISPARAGING STATEMENTS AND
INVASIONS OF PRIVACY CONSTITUE A MATERIAL AND
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES

The trial court erred in finding that Appellee’s extensive campaign to disparage her exhusband was the natural frustration of divorce. In the Trial Court’s view, in every marriage it is
contemplated at the time of divorce that parties will say mean things about their ex-spouses.
The Trial Court stated the following:
“THE COURT: “. . . parties say mean things about each other all the time in divorce
cases. Sometimes they print it. Sometimes, you know, Facebook, whatever tweet,
tweeter, Twitter, whatever. It's not unusual. Unfortunately, it's not unusual for people,
the two parties in a divorce to say things that are mean about each other both before,
both during and after the divorce. And of course sometimes some of those things are
false.” (R. Vol. 1, 634; Transcript, 25)
Contrary to the Trial Court’s finding, a court should be free to address torts in a divorce actions,
especially in light of technological advances such as Facebook, Twitter, and other social media
published on the Internet.
The Appellant is asking this Court to draw a line for divorced parties with nondisparagement clauses in their decrees of divorce to assist them in knowing the boundaries
between natural venting and highly offensive public disparagement. While there certainly
exists the natural frustration of divorce and the healthy “venting” process associated with
healing from divorce, Appellee has wrongfully sought public outlets to communicate intimate
private details, and to communicate messages containing false and misleading content for her
venting. The overwhelming result is that the Appellee’s actions violate both public policy and
decency. Additionally, because the extent of the Appellee's action have all come to light since
issuance of the divorce decree, the Appellant thus maintains that they constitute material and
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substantial changes in circumstances not contemplated at the time the decree of divorce was
entered.

c.

THE APPELLANT SEEKS TO MODIFY HIS DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND NOT LITIGATE A TORT

The Appellant’s petition before the court did not seek to litigate a tort, but rather sought to
modify Paragraph 22 of the parties’ Decree of Divorce. The District Court erred in its grant of
dismissal when making its finding that “[t]he Court finds that the allegations set forth in the
Petition to Modify amount to an allegation of tort claim and, therefore, the divorce action is not
the proper forum to litigate a tort claim.” (R. Vol. 1, 636; Transcript, 27, line 20) The trial
court also stated “I think your only remedy is to file a tort action so—and I just don’t think you
can use the divorce case as a basis.” (R. Vol. 1, 636; Transcript, 27, line 20)
The trial court conflated joinder of tort and divorce actions with what this Court held in
Bayles v. Bayles allowing trial courts to consider torts in divorce actions. Bayles v. Bayles,
1999 UT App 128, 981 P.2d 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Whereas Utah courts suggest that
joinder is impermissible, they also suggest that torts may be addressed—even though the notion
of specifically how they may be “addressed” is not defined or expounded. The Appellant asks
this Court to provide some guidance on what “free to address” means in this context. The
controlling case on the issue is the 1999 case of Bayles v. Bayles, 1999 UT App 128, 981 P.2d
403 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
This Court held in Bayles that a trial court can consider a tort in a divorce action
although a trial court cannot join a tort action with a divorce action. The Courts specifically
states that “ . . . divorce courts are free to address [torts], . . .” Id. at 406 (citing Masters v.
Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct.App.1989)). The clause “[a]lthough divorce courts are
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free to address [torts]” is of increasing significance in the Internet age, especially in light of
technological advances and the increasing ease to disparage or defame or invade the privacy of
a divorcing or divorced spouse; in such cases, divorce courts should be empowered to address
such tortious actions. In this case, the parties already have an existing provision in their Decree
of Divorce, at Paragraph 22, that restrains the Appellee from certain disparaging speech.
The facts of Bayles lend some guidance to this case although it deals with the tort of
fraud. The facts of Bayles arises out of a post-decree dispute where the husband filed a petition
for modification claiming wife had converted funds from the family-owned business for her
personal use. The district court denied wife’s motion to dismiss and she filed an interlocutory
appeal. While Bayles is limited to the intentional tort of fraud, it opens the door for district
courts in Utah to address other torts such as invasion of privacy or the intentional infliction of
emotional distress without empaneling a jury.
In Bayles the husband argued that the wife fraudulently withdrew funds from the martial
business in order to devalue the husband’s share of the property settlement stipulated to by the
parties. Id. at 407. The court held that because husband’s “petition to modify sound[s] in tort”
and “[a] claim of fraud is considered a tort . . . it is not properly addressed in a petition to
modify a divorce decree.” Id. at 406. The court further reasoned as follows, highlighting that a
divorcing party may file an independent tort action to seek redress:
“However, there can be little question that plaintiff’s alleged nefarious activities were
‘contemplated’ in the context of the divorce proceeding. If defendant’s assertions prove
true, defendant may be entitled to relief. This notwithstanding, defendant failed to timely
file a Rule 60(b)(3) motion. Because a claim of fraud contemplated in the context of the
divorce is not generally a proper basis for a petition to modify a divorce decree,
defendant’s only avenue for relief under the facts of this case is to file an independent
action.” Id. at 407.
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In light of the present case at bar, Bayles begs the question: in what manner should a
court address a tort in a divorce action without allowing parties to litigate a tort? In a case
where, such as the instant case, an ex-wife divulges private medical information about her
husband after entry of decree of divorce, how should that issue be resolved if the husband does
not want to assume the costs of funding a separate cause of action? In this case, the question is
easier to resolve because the Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce address an alreadyexisting order of the court regarding disparagement.
The instant case provides a context where “free to address” should allow a trial court to
address the tortious behavior as it may impact a spouse’s ability to earn if their reputation has
been damaged by defamatory or disparaging statements or if private information has been
disseminated to the public without permission or consent. In the latter scenario, such as in this
case, trial courts should consider the tortious invasion of privacy and thereby consider enjoining
the tortfeasor spouse from so acting. Such a restraining order would protect the victim spouse.
Although objections may be raised about the a priori restraint of speech otherwise protected by
the First Amendment, it is not at all uncommon for divorce courts to issue decrees that include
clear and explicit non-disparagement restrictions on the parties such as the present case at bar.
d.

JUDICIAL ECONOMY REQUIRES TRIAL COURTS TO CONSIDER
INTENTIONAL TORTS IN DIVORCE ACTIONS SUCH AS INVASIONS
OF PRIVACY OR DEFMATION ESPECIALLY IN DIVORCE
MODIFATIONS WITH NON-DISPARAGEMENT PROVIONS

One underlying principle of not allowing a trial court to join a divorce and tort action is
due to judicial economy. As Utah appellate courts have noted over a series of cases, trial courts
hearing a divorce action should not empanel a jury or, conversely, a trial court should not hear
issues arising out of a divorce action in a tort action due to principles of res judicata. Judicial
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economy also dictates, as held in Bayles v. Bayles, that although an issue arising in a divorce
action may sound in tort, it may not be a tort as can be seen in the instant case brought by
Appellant.
For example, in Noble v Noble, the court held that tort and divorce actions were barred
from being joined as Bayles would later uphold (Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988)).
In Noble, the husband filed for divorce and wife counterclaimed for divorce on the ground that
her husband had physically abused her when he shot her in the head while she had lain on the
bed. In Noble, the Supreme Court consolidated two separate appeals. The second case arose
because wife had later filed a tort action against her husband based on the same shooting
incident; in the second case, wife asserted claims based on negligence, battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court of Utah held that res judicata did not bar
her from preceding on her separate tort claim against husband following their divorce, which
was due to the bar on tort claims tried as part of a divorce action. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d
1369, 1374-137 (Utah 1988). Noble is of critical importance because the Supreme Court stated
at footnote seven of the opinion, that the court had only addressed intentional torts as being
barred from joinder with divorce actions and that the Court had not ever addressed, including
the Noble decision, negligence claims in the context of joinder. Footnote seven states as
follows:
“Elaine has also appealed from Judge Ballif’s ruling that her negligence claim was
barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity. She argues that the partial summary
judgment was in error because the common law doctrine was held to have been
abrogated as to negligence actions in Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590
(Utah 1980). In Stoker, this Court held that the doctrine had been abrogated with respect
to intentional torts. Id. at 590, 592. We have never had occasion to decide whether this
abrogation extended to negligence claims, and we do not do so in this case. It is
unnecessary for us to reach that question because our disposition of Elaine's intentional
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tort action makes it a certainty that she will have a remedy for her injuries.” Noble v.
Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, fn. 7 (Utah 1988).

Although footnote seven clarifies the status of case law regarding what torts can or
cannot be joined to a divorce action, the courts in the 1980s or 1990s could not have considered
the impact of technological advances and their ability to spread quickly defamatory or
disparaging statements about a spouse or a tortious invasion of the spouse’s privacy. Therefore,
intentional torts should be considered by courts in divorce actions as suggested by Bayles. This
does not mean courts should empanel a jury or assess damages in a divorce action, but, among
other possible remedies, injunctive relief should be available to restrain a divorcing party from
publishing defamatory remarks or private facts to the public. The present case is not as broadly
construed because of paragraph 22 of the parties’ Decree of Divorce that already restrains one
of the parties (the Appellee).
The principle of judicial economy in the context of interspousal torts can be found
elsewhere in Utah case law. For example, in Walther, wife counter-petitioned for a decree of
divorce and requested damages for the intentional tort of battery asserting general damages in
the amount of $75,000. Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985). The Supreme Court of
Utah held that “wife’s claim was clearly framed in tort” and that “[t]he trial court should not
have tried the wife’s tort claim as part of this divorce action.” Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d
387, 387 (Utah 1985). In making this decision, the Supreme Court relied on Lord v. Shaw, 665
P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983) where the same court observed the following:
“[T]he trial court held that the plaintiff was barred by res judicata from suing her exhusband for torts which occurred during the marriage, because his liability for any tort
should have been litigated in the divorce action. We do not comment on this ruling other
than to observe that actionable torts between married persons should not be litigated in a
divorce proceeding. We believe that divorce actions will become unduly complicated in
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their trial and disposition if torts can be or must be litigated in the same action. A
divorce action is highly equitable in nature, whereas the trial of a tort claim is at law and
may well involve, as in this case, a request for trial by jury. The administration of justice
will be better served by keeping the two proceedings separate.” Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d
1288, 1291 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).
In sum, it thus appears we have competing priorities vis-à-vis the principle of judicial
economy in case law. While Lord v. Shaw addresses the problem of judicial economy when
joining divorce and tort actions, judicial economy nevertheless is arguably not preserved when
torts are not considered in divorce actions such as in Appellant’s petition to modify his decree
of divorce. Certainly juries should not be empaneled, nor damages assessed in a divorce action
for alleged tortious actions; however, judicial economy also dictates that separate tort actions
should not be the only avenue for relief if a divorcing party defames or invades their exspouse’s privacy. In this case, the Appellant only seeks to expand an already-existing nondisparagement clause in the Decree of Divorce.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENJOINING THE
APELLEE FROM DISPARAGING THE APPELLANT.

That the District Court erred as a matter of law by denying the Appellant’s request for
preliminary injunction. The District Court erred in its understanding of the law when it found
that “[u]nless a party can show immediate and irreparable harm, a temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction cannot be maintained.” The District Court erred in its finding and
conclusion that “It is not enough to allege that the actions of Appellee are damaging Appellant’s
reputation unless there is some real harm” despite the overwhelming evidence that the actions
of the Appellee demonstrates not only real harm but the threat of irreparable harm. The Utah
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Supreme Court held that a “[p]reliminary injunction is an anticipatory remedy purposed to
prevent the perpetration of a threatened wrong or to compel the cessation of a continuing one,
and it further serves to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of the case.” Hunsaker v.
Kersh, 1999 UT 106, ¶ 9. In this case, the trial court found that harm must occur before a
preliminary injunction is to be issued; however, the standard is clear that a preliminary
injunction is designed to prevent the threatened wrong. Additionally, even if the trial court
were not in clear error, its own standard should not have dismissed all the disparaging
publications of Appellee. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a preliminary
injunction should issue to prevent “[w]rongs of a repeated and continuing character, or which
occasion damages that are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard....
Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, ¶ 9 (citing System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421,
427–28 (Utah 1983).
a.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DEFINING IRREPARALE HARM.

The Trial Court erred in defining irreparable harm in the instant case. The Supreme
Court of Utah has provided guidance on the very issue of what constitutes “irreparable harm”
when it stated that “‘[i]rreparable injury’ justifying an injunction is that which cannot be
adequately compensated in damages or for which damages cannot be compensable in money.”
Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, ¶ 9 (citing System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421,
427–28 (Utah 1983). In this case, the trial court found that “[t]here’s no evidence here that Mr.
Stevens lost his job or that there was a reduction in income or that somehow it’s affected him. I
just—that’s the hurdle I think you need to get over for a TRO is this irreparable harm.” (R.
Vol. 1, 635; Transcript, 26, line 1) The Trial Court in this case held in stark contrast to Utah
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appellate courts. Indeed, the Appellant did not offer evidence of compensable damages because
his petition was filed to modify a divorce decree, not litigate a tort.
The Trial Court also stated that “unless there is some real harm it means nothing, at least
in terms of a TRO.” (R. Vol. 1, 635; Transcript, 26, line 7) The Trial Court failed to apply the
applicable standard as it relates to irreparable harm. The trial court conflated the “threat” of
immediate and irreparable harm with actual harm. All is needed is the threat of irreparable
harm.
Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure set forth the required grounds for an
injunction to be issued. Rule 65A(e)(1) requires a finding “the applicant will suffer irreparable
harm unless the order or injunction issues.” In this case, the Appellee’s public statements and
public actions and statements have caused, and continue to cause harm to the Appellant’s
professional reputation, standing, activities, and obligations. If the Appellee is not immediately
restrained, the good standing of the Appellant’s professional reputation and employment
activities will continue to be irreparably damaged.
b.

THE ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WOULD NOT BE
ADVERSE TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The very law cited herein specifically states that the type of statements made by the
Petitioner should be restrained. It is in the public interest that intimate details of one’s marriage
and intimate personal life be protected and preserved in private if the party so decides.
c.

SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD THAT THE RESPONDENT WILL
CONTINUE TO BE HARMED BY APPELLEE’S ACTIONS

An abundance of evidence is provided to the Court on Appellant’s ex-parte motion with
specific details about the Appellee’s statements to third parties. The statements are private in
nature, or cast the Appellant in a false light, and are unequivocally made by the Appellee. The
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Appellee has repeatedly made known her explicit intent to continue on her path to disparage the
Appellant and to cause him harm by casting him in a false and misleading light.
d.

TRIAL COURT HAS EQUITABLE POWERS IN DOMESTIC
RELATIONS CASES TO ENJOIN A SPOUSE FROM DISPARAGING
THE OTHER

Rule 65A(F) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[n]othing in this rule shall
be construed to limit the equitable powers of the courts in domestic relations cases.” In addition
to Utah case law on modification of decrees of divorce and invasion of privacy claims, this
Court has broad discretion under its equitable powers in domestic cases to issue the injunction
permanently or until, if necessary, the petition to modify is resolved.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE APPELLANT LEAVE
OF COURT TO AMEND THE VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE.

That the District Court abused its discretion by holding that “Commissioner Wilson’s
recommendation is modified to remove the permission for leave to file an amended petition.”
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that a party may amend its pleading with the court’s permission: “(a)(2)
In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the court’s permission or the
opposing party’s written consent. The party must attach its proposed amended pleading to the
motion to permit an amended pleading. The court should freely give permission when justice
requires.” See Ut. R. Civ. Pro., R. 15(a)(2).
In this case, the Appellant sought to amend his petition to include additional facts
supporting the material and substantial changes he pled. The Honorable Commissioner Wilson
granted leave of court to amend Appellant’s Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce.
However, the Honorable Judge Ernie W. Jones denied the Appellant’s request to amend his
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pleadings because “we’re going to be right back here on the same issue which is these hurtful
statements.” (R. Vol. 1, 636; Transcript, 27, line 16) In other words, the trial court held it
would be a moot point to amend because, in his words, “I think your only remedy is to file a
tort action so—and I just don’t think you can use the divorce case as a basis.” (R. Vol. 1, 636;
Transcript, 27, line 20) This is clear error and trial courts “should freely give permission when
justice requires.” See Ut. R. Civ. Pro., R. 15(a)(2).
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The Appellant requests that this Court reverses the Trial Court’s decision to grant
Appellee’s motion to dismiss and to deny the Appellant’s motion for a preliminary injunction
enjoining the Appellee from disparaging him and remand the case to be heard on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of January, 2017.
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID W. READ, LLC

David W. Read
Attorney for Appellant
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